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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Illenberg, Christina Facility: Taconic CF 
NYSID: 07156046-R Appeal Control No.: 03-184-19 B 
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Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Board Member(s) 
who participated: 
Papers considered: 
Wei! Gotshal and Manges 
767 Fifth Avenue 
New York, New York 10153 
March 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 
months. 
Berliner, Shapiro, Cruse 
Appellant's Brief received June 3, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit' s Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Fonn 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to _ ___ _ 
Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to-----
/ 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ____ _ 
Comm issioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit ' s Findings and the s;warate fmRings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate' s Counsel , if any, on'f/'~7 / /t . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant- Appellant's Counsel - lnst. Parole File- Central File 
P-2002(B) (1 1/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the March 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 12-month hold. Appellant's instant offense is murdering her paramour and stealing his money to 
support her drug addiction habit. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary 
and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the DA letter should be ignored as it only deals 
with the instant offense. 3) no aggravating factors exist. 4) the decision illegally resentenced her. 
5) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law and the 2017 
regulations in that the attempted departure from the COMP AS was void, and the laws are now 
rehabilitation and forward/future based. 
Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268,990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and 
criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D .2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See,~, Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. ofParole, 239 A.D.2d 235,.239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497,49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter ofPhillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight. Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmtv. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101,65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter ofMullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
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The Board may acknowledge the senseless and violent nature of the crime. Sanchez v Dennison, 
21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 
30 A.D.3d 880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765 (3d Dept. 2006). 
The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. ofParole, 164 A.D.3d 996,997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891,630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. ofParole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569N.Y.S.2d 846,847 (3d Dept. 1991); MatterofLynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012,442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981). Contrary to 
appellant's claim, the DA letters do not rely only on the past instant offense. 
The Board may consider negative aspects ofthe COMPAS instrument. Matter of Espinal v. New 
York Bd. ofParole. 2019NY Slip Op 04080, 2019N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4057 (3d Dept. May 23, 
2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 
50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance 
abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter ofWade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 
508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related 
crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 
(3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 
57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017). 
The Board may deny parole release without the existence of any aggravating factors, no matter 
how exemplary the institutional record is. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 1272, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive 
Law§ 259 et seq.; Penal Law§ 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320,920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. ofParole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court. Maner of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142,822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been 
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resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton vNew York State Division ofParole, 119 A.D.3d 1268,990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232,242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board ofParole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1 51 Dept. 2019). 
The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. ofParole, 204 A.D.2d 456,611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128,468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y. S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments 
have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Boar,d in 2017. 
The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. 
Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 20 18). The 2017 amended regulations don't create any substantive right to release, but 
rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board's 
interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown 
v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018); Peckham v. Calogero, 12 N.Y.3d 
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424, 883 N.Y.S.3d 751 (2009); Hemy v. Coughlin, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d Dept. 
1995). 
Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). 
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042,22 N.Y.S.3d 640,645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068,30 N.Y.S.3d 834; MatterofRobles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386,387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)( c )(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument 
cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 13 7 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N. Y.S.3d 815. Rather, 
the COMP AS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter 
of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); 
accord Matter ofDawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). Thus, even 
where the First Department has "take[ n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision 
of [the Board]", it has nonetheless reiterated that "[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each 
factor, or to give every factor equal weight" and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize 
"factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors". Matter 
ofRossakis v. New York State Bd. ofParole, 146 A.D.3d 22,29 (1st Dept. 2016). 
Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 
27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming "any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive"). Indeed, the 
COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board's authority to determine, based on members' 
independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)( c )(A)'s factors, whether an inmate should 
be released. See 201 1 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 1 16 
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A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amended regulation was intended to increase 
transparency in the Board's decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board 
departs from scales in denying an inmate release. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 
2. 
Despite the language in the decision, the Board did not depart from th~ COMP AS. That is 
because it cited a negative COMPAS score in the Board decision, and also used the deprecation 
language as to the serious nature of the crime criteria in the decision as well. So, the Board did not 
depart from the COMP AS. 
Recommendation: Affirm. 
